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This paper examines patterns and changes of shares of the state sector, including state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) and other state entities, and foreign multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) in Vietnam since the mid-1990s. Because most Vietnamese are still self-employed or 
household workers with little or no connection to the state sector or MNEs, it is important to 
exclude the household sector from these comparisons. First, ownership shares vary markedly 
among economic activities. For example, economy-wide estimates indicate that MNEs and 
state sector have both been relatively small employers, but larger producers. MNEs have also 
become by far the largest exporters. Second, ownership shares and their trends vary 
substantially depending on the data source. Most conspicuously, SOE shares of non-
household enterprise employment and sales have decreased rapidly since 2000. On the other 
hand, economy-wide estimates of state shares in non-household employment and GDP 
declined much more slowly. Recent discrepancies between these estimates have become so 
large that they almost certainly result from errors in one or more data sources. There are also 
smaller discrepancies between corresponding, alternative estimates of MNE shares. The 
extent of privatization of SOEs and its economic effects are thus ambiguous in Vietnam, 
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Many previous studies, policy documents, and compilations of official statistics have 
documented the rapid growth of foreign multinational enterprises (MNEs) in Vietnam after 
the substantial reforms (Doi Moi) that began in 1986 and stabilization of the economy in the 
mid-1990s. These sources often primarily rely on two distinct data sources, economy-wide 
estimates of GDP (from national accounts), employment (from labor force surveys), and 
exports or imports (from customs’ trade data), on the one hand, and estimates of firm turnover, 
employment, and other activities (including trade in recent years) collected by enterprise 
surveys, on the other.  
These data consistently suggest that ownership shares vary among economic activities in 
Vietnam. For example, both economy-wide and firm data indicate that MNE export shares 
have been conspicuously large, while corresponding shares of non-household GDP or firm 
sales have been smaller; in other words, MNEs have had relatively high export propensities 
(export-production ratios). Similarly, the state sector, including state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) and other state entities, has accounted for larger shares of non-household production 
than employment, and SOEs have had higher shares of firm sales than employment; in other 
words, average labor productivity has been relatively high in SOEs compared to the average. 
However, economy-wide and firm data also differ in important respects. For example, the 
firm data suggest that SOE shares of firm turnover and employment fell rapidly in 2000-2014, 
but corresponding state shares of non-household GDP or employment declined slowly. MNE 
shares of firm sales also rose more slowly than corresponding shares of non-household GDP.  
After a brief literature review which illustrates the economic importance of analyzing 
ownership-related issues (Section 2), this paper first carefully compares alternative estimates 
of state or SOE shares and MNE of non-household production and employment from 
economy-wide and enterprise data (Section 3). Because predominantly rural households and 
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self-employed workers continue to account for about one-third of GDP and over three-fourths 
of employment in Vietnam, the household sector is carefully excluded. 1  Section 4 then 
reviews economy-wide evidence on MNE shares of exports for 1995-2015 and presents new 
compilations of firm export data for 2011-2012. Both sources indicate that MNEs account for 
relatively large export shares of and have high export propensities. The firm also data indicate 
that wholly-foreign MNE (WFs), which now account for the vast majority of MNE activity, 
make particularly large contributions to exports. However, the analysis reveals several 
important problems in firm export data for these and other years, and the analysis focuses on 
identifying potential causes and how they might be addressed in subsequent research. Finally, 
we highlight the important policy implications emerging from the literature and the empirical 
analyses (Section 5), before concluding (Section 6).  
 
2. Literature Review  
Theory and empirical evidence suggest MNEs are likely to possess relatively large amounts 
of generally knowledge-based, intangible, firm-specific assets related to production 
technology, marketing, and entrepreneurship. Those assets should make MNEs more 
productive than non-MNEs (Buckley and Casson 1992; Casson 1987; Caves 2007; Dunning 
1993; Rugman 1980, 1985). This is reflected by larger firm size, higher factor productivity 
and factor returns, and/or higher capital or technology intensity in MNEs.  
Previous evidence from large, heterogeneous samples of Vietnam’s manufacturing firms in 
many industries is broadly consistent with the hypothesis that MNEs had relatively high total 
factor productivity (TFP) after accounting for factor intensities and scale, among other firm- 
and industry-level characteristics (Athukorala and Tien 2012; Ramstetter and Phan 2013). 
                                                 
1 The large household sector reflects Vietnam’s status as a relatively low-income developing economy (per 
capita GDP of US$2,052 in 2013; General Statistics Office various years b). The household share of 
exports is not known but is probably close to zero. 
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However, when more homogenous samples of firms were analyzed in manufacturing groups, 
MNE-private and SOE-private differentials were often insignificant or inconsistent.  
Similar evidence is common for large heterogeneous samples of Chinese manufacturing 
firms (Wang and Wang 2015) and manufacturing plants in Indonesia (Takii 2004), for 
example. On the other hand, evidence for manufacturing plants in Malaysia and Thailand 
(Haji Ahmad, 2010; Menon, 1998; Oguchi et al. 2002; Ramstetter 2004) indicates that MNE-
local differentials in productivity levels or growth were often small and/or insignificant, even 
in large heterogeneous samples. Industry-level results from Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand 
also suggest that insignificant productivity differentials were common. 
Related research on wages paid by manufacturing firms in Vietnam (Nguyen 2015; Nguyen 
and Ramstetter 2015a, 2015b), as well as manufacturing plants in Indonesia (Lipsey and 
Sjöholm 2004; Ramstetter and Narjoko 2013) and Malaysia (Ramstetter 2014), provide 
stronger evidence that MNEs tend to pay relatively high wages, even at the industry level and 
after the educational background of workers, worker occupation, and other firm- or plant-
level characteristics are controlled for. MNE-local or MNE-private wage differentials were 
also relatively large for high-wage, white-collar (non-production) workers in Indonesia and 
Vietnam. Hale and Long (2011) found a similar pattern for a small sample of Chinese firms, 
but that foreign ownership had no effect on wages of relatively low-wage, ordinary workers.  
In contrast to MNEs, economists since Adam Smith have long assumed that SOEs tend to 
be more inefficient than private firms because SOE managers have relatively weak incentives 
to minimize costs or maximize revenues. If this inefficiency leads to low labor productivity, 
for example, then SOEs are likely to pay relatively low wages. However, previous empirical 
evidence suggests that SOEs often pay relatively high wages and have relatively high 
productivity in Vietnam (Ramstetter and Phan 2013; Nguyen 2015; Nguyen and Ramstetter 
2015a, 2015b) and elsewhere (Brown et al., 2004, 2005; Djankov and Murrell 2002; 
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Megginson, and Netter 2001). Governments often choose to establish SOEs in relatively high-
productivity, high-wage industries such as steel. This is an important reason SOEs may have 
relatively high productivity or wages in samples covering several heterogeneous industries. 
However, even within the steel industry, for example, firm-level evidence suggests that SOEs 
or former SOEs were among the most efficient and profitable producers in China, Korea and 
Taiwan in the 1990s (Ramstetter and Movshuk 2005).  
MNEs may also tend to export more than non-MNEs because exporting firms are more 
productive than non-exporters and MNEs have relatively high productivity. However, it is 
very difficult to sort out the direction of causality. Does high productivity lead to exporting, 
or does exporting force firms to become more productive, or does causality run both 
directions (Bernard and Jensen 2004, Melitz 2003)? Perhaps more importantly, MNEs make 
large investments in international marketing networks and have extensive experience with 
international trade. Accumulation of related, generally intangible assets is another key reason 
that firms become able to export relatively cheaply (Roberts and Tybout 1997). Thus, even if 
ownership-related productivity differentials are not pervasive, MNEs may have higher export 
propensities than non-MNEs. This is an important story told by previous studies suggesting 
that MNE-local differentials in export-sales ratios often remain highly significant statistically 
after accounting for plant-level characteristics such as factor intensity, scale, and vintage in 
Indonesia (Ramstetter 1999; Ramstetter and Takii 2006; Sjöholm and Takii 2006) and 
Thailand (Ramstetter 1994; Ramstetter and Umemoto 2006).  
Another important story relates to evidence that export propensities tend to be highest 
among wholly-foreign MNEs or MNEs with very large foreign ownership shares of 90 
percent or more, and that these ownership-related differences often remain statistically 
significant after accounting for related firm- or plant-level characteristics in Vietnam, 
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Indonesia, and Thailand. 2 Similarly, Moran (2001) argues that MNE affiliates which are well 
integrated into the parent’s network are likely to contribute more to host economies than 
affiliates which are isolated from the parent-controlled network by ownership restrictions or 
local content requirements.  
The evidence also suggests that the extent of foreign ownership is strongly related to 
exporting but not to productivity.3 This in turn suggests that MNE parents restrict access of 
their minority-owned affiliates to exporting networks more than access to technology-related 
assets. This may result because MNEs in Vietnam and other developing economies often use 
relatively simple technologies in labor-intensive assembly. Correspondingly, the risk of 
leaking sophisticated technologies through minority-owned affiliates is often relatively small. 
On the other hand, the risks of minority-owned affiliates oversupplying export markets are 
often larger and MNEs sometimes forbid local partners in minority-foreign affiliates from 
exporting the MNE’s products.  
Particularly in the 1980s and 1990s, several developing economies in Southeast Asia and 
elsewhere relaxed ownership restrictions and local content requirements for MNEs exporting 
large portions of output. Thus, strong correlations between foreign ownership shares and 
export propensities may result from policy biases, as well as MNE strategies. Vietnam is an 
interesting case because there have been few formal foreign ownership restrictions after the 
promulgation of the first foreign investment law in 1988, soon after Doi Moi. Nonetheless, 
implementation and formal policy sometimes diverged, with government officials effectively 
limiting foreign ownership shares in some cases, especially before the promulgation of the 
Enterprise Law in 2000. This bias weakened after the Law’s subsequent implementation (Van 
                                                 
2 See Phan and Ramstetter (2009) on Vietnam, Ramstetter (1999) and Ramstetter and Takii (2006) on 
Indonesia, and Ramstetter (1994) and Ramstetter and Umemoto (2006) on Thailand.  
3 Moran’s argument also suggests that productivity should be higher in MNEs with relatively large foreign 
ownership shares, but the evidence is often inconsistent with this latter hypothesis in Indonesia (Takii 
2004), Thailand (Ramstetter 2004), or Vietnam (Ramstetter and Phan 2013), for example. 
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Arkadie and Mallon 2003), reforms related to the implementation of the Bilateral Trade 
Agreement between Vietnam and the United States in 2001, the implementation of the 
ASEAN Free Trade Agreement in 2005, and further reforms related to Vietnam’s WTO 
accession in early 2007. Thus, if WFs still tend to export relatively large portions of output in 
Vietnam, the main cause is probably MNE strategy, not policy bias. 
 
3. Estimates of Production and Employment by Owner 
This section compares economy-wide estimates of non-household production (GDP from 
the national accounts) and employment (from labor force survey publications and revised 
series on the web) and corresponding estimates from the enterprise surveys (published 
compilations, supplemented with unpublished compilations from underlying firm-level data). 
It emphasizes how recent, substantial declines of SOE shares of firm activity during 2000-
2014, contrast with much smaller declines in state shares of corresponding, economy-wide 
estimates. Definitional and methodological differences are potentially important and the 
section analyzes how they might contribute to discrepancies. As emphasized in the 
introduction, households and the self-employed are carefully excluded from the comparisons.  
 
3.1. Production Estimates  
In 2000, state shares of non-household GDP and SOE shares of firm sales (from published 
compilations) were similar (57 vs. 55 percent) and MNE shares of both measures were 
identical (20 percent, Table 1). MNE shares of both measures remained similar at 19-22 
percent through 2005. However, as early as 2004, the SOE share of firm sales was 10 
percentage points lower than the state share of non-household GDP (46 vs. 56 percent), and 
this discrepancy widened to 20 percentage points or more from 2007. By 2014, the SOE share 
of firm sales was only 22 percent, but the corresponding state share of non-household GDP 
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remained close to one-half. MNE shares of non-household GDP also increased more rapidly 
than shares of firm sales. Discrepancies between these shares reached 7-9 percentage points in 
2008-2011, before falling back to 5 percentage points in 2013-2014, when MNEs accounted 
for about one-fourth of firm sales and 30-31 percent of non-household GDP.  
Because state/SOE and MNE shares of non-household GDP and firm sales were similar in 
2000, private shares were also similar at 23 and 25 percent, respectively (Table 1). However, 
the private share of non-household GDP subsequently declined from 22-24 percent in 1998-
2009 to 20-21 percent in 2010-2015 (Table 1).4 In marked contrast, private shares of firm 
sales almost doubled in 2000-2007, from 25 to 47 percent, before stabilizing at about one-half 
in 2008-2014. What is responsible for these discrepancies and their explosive growth? 
Perhaps most importantly, the extent to which state shares of non-household GDP include 
non-SOE activities of the government and other state organizations is ambiguous. The 
substantial widening of discrepancies between state shares of non-household GDP and SOE 
shares of firm sales suggests that direct production by non-SOE state entities grew rapidly 
after the mid-2000s. However, the inability to identify precisely which non-SOE state entities 
have become so large creates suspicion that estimation error may also be involved.  
There are several potentially important sources of measurement error. Because it is 
important to publish GDP estimates in a timely fashion, GDP must be estimated rapidly, often 
on the basis of relatively incomplete information. This is why preliminary and revised GDP 
estimates often differ greatly. Vietnam contrasts with many economies because GDP 
estimates are published relatively rapidly and differences between preliminary and revised 
estimates are usually relatively small. This creates the impression that Vietnam’s GDP 
estimates may rely on relatively incomplete information and embody large errors as a result.  
Although processing detailed firm surveys requires more time than estimating GDP, 
                                                 
4 Part of this decline may also be related to the exclusion of “products taxes less subsidies on production” 
from ownership-based estimates of GDP from 2010 forward. 
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Vietnam’s enterprise data are available relatively quickly and coverage is relatively 
comprehensive.5 Compilations of firm sales (or employment) are also straightforward. If 
firms report data accurately, sums can be compiled directly from survey questionnaires. 
Alternatively, if firms tend to underreport sales because they fear accurate reporting could 
result in tax difficulties, for example, sums can be adjusted to reflect the probable extent of 
underreporting. Here it is important that underreporting by MNE and SOEs is likely to be 
relatively small because these firms are often prominent and underreporting easy to discover. 
On the other hand, the reverse may be true for most private firms, which tend to be relatively 
small. Correspondingly, SOE and MNE shares of firm sales may be overestimated in the firm 
data, even though comparisons to GDP data suggest the opposite pattern for recent years. 
Previous studies (Ramstetter and Phan 2013; Ramstetter and Nguyen 2016) have also 
highlighted potentially important problems encountered when compiling unpublished, firm-
level data from enterprise surveys. For example, especially in earlier years, the firm-level data 
included several records with duplicate ID tags and duplicate or near duplicate records. 
Numerous firms also reported obviously unrealistic or economically meaningless data. 
Compilations from the firm-level data often differ from published compilations because they 
omit firms reporting unrealistic or meaningless data.6 Another, rarely discussed problem is 
how firm IDs are defined when takeovers occur (after takeover, the larger firm’s ID is 
retained, but the smaller firm’s ID is deleted). As a result, it is very difficult, if not impossible, 
                                                 
5 Enterprise surveys cover all non-household firms with over 10 employees in all industries, but exclude 
household firms and organizations other than firms, and collect limited information from firms with 10 or 
fewer employees (Jammal et al, 2006).  
6 For example, a number of firms report non-positive turnover or employment. Our compilations excluding 
these firms for 2000-2014 suggest an average of 2.3 percent lower firm sales than the published 
compilations used in Table 1. However, there were large fluctuations in these differentials, with our 
compilations yielding 8 to 11 percent lower sums in 2006-2008 and 2014, and 4 percent larger sums in 
2001 and 2013. Unrealistic fluctuations in key variables also appear to be obvious input errors in some 
cases. For example, some firms may report sales growth rates of 10 percent in year 1, 1000 percent in year 
2, and 20 percent in year 3, but employment growth rates of 12 percent, 15 percent and 17 percent, 
respectively. Most firms reporting unrealistic or unusual data are small, partially because it is easier to 
identify and correct obvious mistakes in data for relatively prominent, large firms. 
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to identify takeovers in the firm-level data. However, despite these problems, our substantial 
experience using the firm data leads us to believe they generally provide a relatively reliable 
and comprehensive picture of aggregate firm performance.  
It is also potentially important that firm sales include intermediate expenditures on parts, 
materials, energy and utilities, and some services, which GDP or value added excludes. For 
example, MNEs often have relatively low ratios of value added to sales, especially in key 
processing industries like electronics, footwear, and apparel. Thus, MNE shares of sales might 
exceed corresponding shares of value added.7  On the other hand, ratios of intermediate 
expenditures to sales are not likely to change dramatically over time. Thus, this definitional 
difference probably cannot explain the widening of discrepancies between alternative 
estimates of SOE and MNE shares observed in Table 1. 
Differences in ownership classifications are also potentially important. Notably, the 
national accounts data do not clarify how they classify joint ventures (JVs) involving SOEs 
and MNEs. Published compilations of the enterprise data classify all MNE JVs as MNEs and 
a small group of private joint stock companies “having capital of state” as private. Survey 
questionnaires define the latter group as joint stock companies “having state capital ≤ 50%” 
and ask for the share of state capital, but several firms explicitly report zero state shares.8 
Questionnaires also ask the state share in private limited companies, but published 
                                                 
7 One would like calculate firm value added directly, but enterprise surveys do not collect necessary, firm-
level information on intermediate costs. The General Statistics Office has approximate estimates of value 
added for major products of firms, but they use industry-level input-output coefficients. Correspondingly, 
estimates for several firms yield negative value added or apparently unrealistic value-added per worker 
levels (Ramstetter and Phan 2013).  
8 For example, after samples were limited to firms with positive employment and turnover, the 2014 data 
contained 1,472 firms with 397,077 workers in this category (96 and 98 percent of published estimates 
[General Statistics Office 2016], respectively), of which 117 firms with 18,709 workers reported 0 shares 
and 1 firm with 213 workers did not report the state share.  
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compilations do not clarify that a few firms in this large group have state capital.9 In order to 
investigate whether reclassifying these SOE JVs as SOEs might explain the widening 
discrepancies between state shares of non-household GDP and SOE shares of firm sales, 
shares of all SOE-private JVs (defined as all private joint stock and private limited companies 
with positive state shares) and MNE-SOE JVs (which are classified separately) were 
calculated from unpublished, firm-level data.10 
In 2000-2006, MNE-SOE JVs were relatively large, accounting for 10-12 percent of sales 
by firms with positive sales and employment, but this share fell to as low as 2-4 percent in 
2012-2014 (Table 1). In other words, the vast majority of sales by MNE JVs were from JVs 
with SOEs. However, because their shares declined to low levels, reclassifying MNE-SOE 
JVs as SOEs cannot explain the increasingly large discrepancies between SOE shares of firm 
sales and state shares of non-household GDP. Similarly, after rising from 5 to 7 percent in 
2005-2008, shares of SOE-private JVs also fell to 4-5 percent in 2012-2014. Thus 
reclassifying SOE-private JVs also cannot explain the widening discrepancies either.  
 
3.2. Employment Estimates and Comparisons of Production and Employment Shares 
Comparisons of non-household employment estimates from the Labor Force Surveys (LFS, 
including updated series available on the web) and enterprise data also suggest that state 
shares (56 percent in 2007, 44-47 percent in 2009-2014, and 39 percent in 2015) were much 
larger than corresponding SOE shares of enterprise employment (21-24 percent in 2007-2009 
                                                 
9 2014 data contained 210,234 firms with 3,586,497 workers in this category (82 and 95 percent of 
published estimates [General Statistics Office 2016], respectively), of which 893 firms with 26,588 workers 
reported positive state shares.  
10 Both of these estimates probably overestimate the extent of state control because state shares are very 
small (9 percent or less) in several SOE-private JVs (e.g., 744 of 893 limited companies and 124 of 1,354 
joint stock companies), and MNEs dominate in many MNE-SOE JVs.  
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and 18-22 percent in 2010-2014, Table 2).11 Here again, this presumably results primarily 
because the LFS estimates of state employment (4.8-5.5 million in 2007 and 2009-2014) 
include numerous state workers that didn’t work for SOEs (2.1-2.2 million workers, 
according the enterprise surveys). However, LFS estimates of total non-household 
employment were remarkably similar to enterprise employment (11.2-12.3 versus 10.9-12.1 
million in 2011-2014). It is also difficult to understand why discrepancies between the two 
state/SOE share estimates were smaller in 2009-2010 (26-28 percentage points) than other 
years (32 percentage points) because this suggests that non-SOE state entities 
counterintuitively reduced employment just after the World Financial Crisis. 
In 2010-2014, economy-wide (LFS) estimates of MNE employment shares (15-17 percent) 
were substantially smaller than corresponding enterprise estimates (22-28 percent), which 
contrasts with patterns observed for MNE production, Table 2).12 These discrepancies also 
increased during this period. On the other hand, both economy-wide (GDP and LFS) 
estimates suggest much smaller private shares than the firm data. Private shares were 59-61 
percent of firm employment, but only 38-39 percent of non-household employment. 
The most reasonable conclusion one can make from careful examination of Tables 1 and 2 
is that there are often large discrepancies between economy-wide (GDP and LFS) estimates of 
state and MNE shares and corresponding estimates of SOE and MNE shares of firm activity, 
and these discrepancies have grown in recent years. The largest source of these discrepancies 
is probably that many state workers are not employed by SOEs. However, the precise 
magnitudes and institutions involved in non-SOE state activity are unclear. Moreover, there 
are discrepancies in trends of SOE and MNE production shares that are difficult to explain, 
                                                 
11 Alternative, presumably revised, time series estimates of state and MNE employment are also available 
on the web from General Statistics Office (various years b) and usually indicate somewhat higher 
employment in these groups than the original LFS publications (Table 2). However, discrepancies among 
these two sources are relatively small, except for MNEs in 2007.  
12 The analysis of MNE employment focuses on the post 2010 period because published estimates in the 
LFS were smaller than revised estimates on the web for 2007 and 2009.  
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except perhaps by measurement error.  
It is also important that ownership shares of production and employment differed 
substantially and relatively consistently. For example, state shares of non-household GDP and 
SOE shares of firm sales exceeded corresponding shares of non-household and firm 
employment in all years. Thus, average labor productivity (non-household GDP or firm sales 
per employee, Table 3) was consistently lower in private firms than in SOEs, for example. 
The scope of these differentials was also similar (52-54 percent lower for non-household GDP 
per worker and 44-54 percent lower for sales per employee) in 2010-2014. 13  These 
differentials partially reflect the large size of SOEs and their concentration in capital-intensive 
industries, while most private firms are relatively small and more labor-intensive.  
Economy-wide estimates also suggest that MNEs consistently had the highest GDP per 
worker (113-319 percent higher than SOEs in 2000-2004 and 48-80 percent higher thereafter, 
Table 3). However, patterns of enterprise sales per worker differed. SOEs had higher labor 
productivity by this measure than all MNEs or private firms in 2005-2014, but MNEs had the 
highest in 2000-2004. MNEs also had lower sales per worker than private firms in 2008-2011.  
The firm data also indicate stark differences between MNE-JVs, particularly MNE-SOE 
JVs, and WFs. WFs had lower sales per worker than SOEs in all years and lower productivity 
than private firms in most (2002-2014, Table 3). Relatively low labor productivity in WFs, 
reflects their importance in generally labor-intensive assembly of major exports such as 
electronics, footwear, and apparel. On the other hand, MNE-SOE JVs, which are classified as 
MNEs in published compilations, had the highest sales per worker of all ownership groups. In 
other words, MNE-SOE JVs accounted for substantially larger shares of firm sales than 
employment (3-12 vs. 1-3 percent Tables 1-2).  
                                                 
13 Estimates for the non-household private sector are only calculated for 2010-2015 because estimates for 
2007 and 2009 appear less reliable than for other years and data for other years are not available. Revised 




4. Exports by Owner 
Economy-wide estimates from commodity trade data show that both MNE export values 
and the MNE shares of Vietnam’s exports rose rapidly over the last two decades. MNE shares 
increased particularly rapidly from 27 percent in 1995 to 45-47 percent in 2001-2002 and then 
55 percent in 2004 (Table 4).14 Reflecting the effects of the 2008-2009 World Financial Crisis, 
MNE shares fell from 57-58 percent in 2005-2007 to 53-55 percent in 2008-2010. In 2009, 
export values also shrunk by 12 percent for MNEs, but only 5.1 percent for non-MNEs. After 
the crisis, rapid increases resumed with MNE shares rising to 63-67 percent in 2012-2014 and 
71 percent in 2015. In short, MNE export shares were conspicuously large and grew rapidly.  
A similar series compiled from monthly trade data reports shows that oil accounted for 30-
40 percent of MNE exports in 2005-2008, but under 10 percent since 2013 and only 2 percent 
in 2015 (Table 4). Correspondingly, MNE shares of non-oil exports were substantially lower 
than shares of all exports in 2005-2006 (45-46 percent vs. 57-58 percent). This difference 
became much smaller in recent years, even in years when oil prices and oil export values were 
still relatively high (e.g., 60 vs. 63 percent in 2012, 65-66 vs. 67 percent in 2013 and 2014). 
The vast majority of non-oil exports are manufactures, which grew particularly rapidly.  
Because MNE shares of exports were much larger than corresponding shares of production, 
export propensities were much larger in MNEs than in non-MNEs (Table 4). For example, 
after 1995, export-GDP ratios have always been larger than 1 in MNEs, increasing to slightly 
over 2 in 2004-2007 and over 3 in 2014-2015. Although these ratios increased in most years, 
there was a particularly steep decline in 2009, following a more modest decline the year 
previous, again reflecting the strong effects of the World Financial Crisis on MNE exports. 
Differentials between MNEs and non-MNEs were relatively stable in 1995-2002 when 
                                                 
14 It is not possible to exclude the household sector from export share estimates, but households and the 
self-employed probably accounted for very few exports. 
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export-GDP ratios were 4.7-5.8 times larger in MNEs. The differentials increased markedly 
thereafter (to over 7 times larger in 2005-2006 and 2011-2012 and over 9 times in 2013-2015), 
but were relatively small during the 2008-2009 crisis years (5.4-5.8 times larger).  
Export-GDP ratios are less accurate measures of export propensities than export-sales or 
export-output ratios, for example, because they mix a measure including intermediate costs 
(exports) and another measure excluding them (GDP or value added).15 As mentioned above, 
processing MNEs probably have higher ratios of intermediate cost to sales or output in 
industries like electronics, apparel, and footwear. Thus, export propensity differentials 
between MNEs and non-MNEs may be smaller than depicted in Table 4 if measured more 
precisely as export-sales or export-output ratios. Nonetheless, trends in all of these export-
production ratios are usually highly correlated. Thus, Table 4 provides strong evidence that 
MNEs have substantially higher export propensities than non-MNEs in Vietnam.  
Correspondingly, manufactured exports have accounted for most of the growth in 
Vietnam’s exports in recent years. Using a broad definition of manufacturing exports 
designed to be consistent with the Vietnam Standard Industrial Classification (VSIC), 
manufacturing exports increased from under $9 billion in 2000 to over $58 billion in 2010, 
and manufacturing’s share of total exports increased from 61 to 81 percent (Table 5).16 Using 
a common but narrower definition of manufacturing exports which excludes many food- and 
resource-intensive exports by manufacturing firms (the sum of Sections 5 to 8 of the Standard 
International Trade Classification [SITC]), the increase was even more rapid, from 43 to 65 
percent. This share continued to increase rapidly to 76 percent in 2014. Typical labor-
intensive manufactures (e.g., food, textiles, apparel, footwear, furniture, and miscellaneous 
manufactures) were among the most important exports through 2010. However, by 2014, 
                                                 
15 Export-GDP ratios often exceed 1 in small, open economies like Vietnam for this reason.  
16 The VSIC is similar to the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), but more detailed in 
some categories. The older, 1993 version (VSIC93) is similar to ISIC revision 3 while the newer, 2007 
version (VSIC07) is similar to ISIC revision 4.  
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electric and electronic machinery became by far the largest category. 
Recent enterprise surveys for 2010-2014 have included questions about the value of firm-
level exports, which allow more precise and detailed examination of ownership-related 
differences in export propensities than previously possible. The compilations in Tables 6-8 is 
one of the first attempts to examine these data carefully, but they probably raise more 
questions than they answer. For example, obvious, large errors result if one sums reported 
firm exports for 2010 and 2013-2014. In 2013, exports reported by medium-large firms with 
20 or more employees sum to $989 billion or almost 7.5 times the $132 billion in total 
merchandise exports reported in commodity trade data (Tables 4-5). Sums of firm exports for 
2010 ($149 billion) and 2014 ($348 billion) were also more than twice the corresponding 
totals reported in merchandise trade data. Although it is impossible to clarify the reason for 
these large discrepancies, initial inspection of the firm-level data suggests unrealistically large 
exports were recorded for several firms in some years.17  
This initial compilation focuses on 2011-2012, for which firm export totals appear more 
realistic. Firm totals were also larger than merchandise totals in these years, by 13 and 10 
percent, respectively (Table 6). Double counting of merchandise exports passing through 
more than one firm or inclusion of service receipts in firm exports are two potential causes of 
discrepancies between the firm-level and merchandise totals. Timing-related discrepancies are 
also potentially important.18 The relatively small differentials in 2011-2012 might be related 
to these factors, but they almost certainly are not the cause of the large discrepancies observed 
in 2010 and 2013-2014.  
The firm export data for 2011 and 2012 also imply some very strange trends and patterns, 
                                                 
17 For example some large exporters report exports that were 1000s of times larger in only one year than in 
other years. Although this is not impossible, reporting or input error is a more likely cause in many cases. 
Much more extensive inspection of firm-level data, including comparisons to trends of related indicators 
(e.g. sales, employment, fixed assets) is required before more definitive conclusions can be reached. 
18 Because accounting criteria differ for firms and customs officials, they may record the same export in 
different years.  
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especially when compared to the merchandise export data, which are based on relatively 
precise customs’ records. First, the growth of firm exports in 2012 was much lower (15 
percent) than the growth of merchandise exports (31 percent, Tables 5, 6). Second, if 73 
percent of food, beverage, and tobacco exports are assumed to be processed manufactures as 
published estimates for 2010 indicate, broadly defined shares of manufactures in merchandise 
exports were 78 percent in 2011 and 81 percent 2012 (Table 5). These shares are similar to 
shares of manufacturing firms in firm exports (76 percent in 2011, 85 percent in 2012), 
though firm data indicate a substantially larger increase between 2011 and 2012 (Table 6). 
The data are also consistent in suggesting that shares of electronic and electronic machinery 
(16 percent of merchandise exports in 2011, 24 percent in 2012) and of computing, electronic, 
and electric machinery (18 and 20 percent, respectively) were the largest.19  
On the other hand, shares of apparel in merchandise exports were much larger (14 and 13 
percent, respectively, Table 5) than shares of apparel firms (8 and 7 percent, respectively, 
Table 6). There were also very large, seemingly implausible fluctuations in several industry 
shares of firm exports; conspicuous examples include wood products (10 and 1 percent, 
respectively), motor vehicles (4 and 9 percent, respectively), and furniture (2 and 9 percent, 
respectively). Firm export values doubled or were halved in 2012 in nine of the 17 
manufacturing industries identified in Table 6. Although there are plausible reasons for these 
fluctuations in some cases, they often appear to result from data reporting or input errors, or 
inconsistent industry classifications of major exporting firms.20 These problems need to be 
examined closely at the firm level before plausible, rigorous analyses can be conducted with 
                                                 
19 Following revision 3 of the Industrial Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), the older (1993) version 
Vietnam Standard Industrial Classification (VSIC93) had four 2-digit categories (VSIC93=30, 31, 32, 33) 
in this category but the newer, 2007 version (VSIC07, similar to ISIC revision 4) had only two related 
categories (26 and 27). These two groups do not correspond exactly, but are similar. 
20 For example, reclassification of major exporters (e.g., Samsung affiliates) from electric machinery to 
computers is a likely cause of fluctuations in these two categories. Similarly, reclassification from 
wholesale trade to manufacturing also appears important.  
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the firm export data.  
Compilations of firm exports by owner in Table 7 also suggest the MNE share of firm 
exports, including both WFs and MNE JVs, was substantially larger than the corresponding 
share of merchandise exports in Table 5 for 2012 (72 vs. 63 percent), but similar in 2011 (56 
vs. 57 percent). WFs accounted for the majority of firm exports in both years (59 percent in 
2012, and 54 percent in 2011). WF shares were larger in manufacturing, around two-thirds. 
WF shares were conspicuously large (90 percent or more) in the computer and electronic 
machinery and electric machinery industries in both years. On the other hand, WF shares were 
relatively low in food products and similar to shares of overall manufacturing in textiles, 
apparel, and leather and footwear, for example. 
Private firms were the second largest source of firm exports in most years, accounting for 
about one-fifth of exports in 2011-2012 (Table 7). Private firm shares of manufacturing firm 
exports were slightly smaller, reflecting relatively large shares in wholesale trade, which 
increased from 31 percent in 2011 to over one-half in 2012. Private shares were also 
conspicuously large in food product manufacturing. Private shares of exports in other 
important manufacturing industries such as textiles, apparel, rubber and plastics were 
relatively large in some years, but small in others.  
Between 2011 and 2012, there were large fluctuations in the shares SOEs and MNE JVs 
that mirrored each other (Table 7). In 2012, MNE JV shares were larger, 13 vs. 8 percent, but 
in 2011, SOE shares were much larger 23 vs. 2 percent. Because that most MNE JVs with 
large sales involve SOEs partners, it seems likely that classification of a few large exporters 
as SOEs in 2011, but as MNE JVs in 2012, might explain much of this variation. SOE shares 
were large in wholesale trade (a little over two-fifths) and in mining, especially in 2011 when 
mining firm exports were small (Table 6). SOE shares were also conspicuously large in wood 
products in 2011 but small in 2012, and this was a large cause of the fall in total SOE exports 
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in 2012. In contrast, MNE JV shares of mining were small in 2011 but large in 2012, again 
suggesting that reclassification or addition of a large oil JV might cause observed fluctuations. 
On the other hand, MNE JV shares were also relatively large in both years in other 
transportation machinery and non-metallic mineral products.  
Finally, although there are obvious, large, and unrealistic fluctuations and patterns observed 
in the firm data, distributions of firms by export propensity (Table 8) are consistent with 
expectations and data from other Southeast Asian economies in suggesting WFs tend to 
export large proportions (90% or more) of their turnover more often than other ownership 
groups. For example, these export-specializing firms accounted for about one-third of all WFs 
and even larger shares of manufacturing WFs (39-40 percent, Table 8). Particularly large 
shares were observed in apparel (55-57 percent), leather and footwear (59-62 percent), 
computers and electronic machinery (50-52 percent), and furniture (55-62 percent). Firms 
with high export propensities also accounted for relatively large shares of MNE JVs (9-12 
percent in all industries, 14-23 percent in manufacturing), but much smaller shares of SOEs or 
private firms (1-2 percent in all industries; 4-6 percent in manufacturing). Nonetheless, here 
again, if one examines the manufacturing industry-level data, several fluctuations are difficult 
to explain. They often occur in industries with relatively small samples of SOEs and MNE 
JVs (fewer than 20 medium-large firms).21  
 
5. Three Policy Implications 
There are at least three important policy implications emerging from this simple analysis. 
First, the labor force data reemphasize the important fact that over three-fourths of Vietnam’s 
workers are self-employed or work in households. Most of these workers are unaffected by 
the emerging corporate sector, which is still in its infancy in many respects. Correspondingly, 
                                                 
21 In contrast, the smallest industry-level samples were 42 for WFs and 72 for private firms. 
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policy makers need to understand that performance of Vietnam’s corporate sector, including 
that of SOEs or MNEs, has little direct effect on the vast majority of Vietnam’s workers. 
Indirect effects through linkages are also probably weak, though indirect effects on 
competition in both output and labor markets are probably more important. There is also good 
reason to think that the rapidly growing private sector (according to the firm data) will 
become increasingly important for Vietnamese workers over the next decade or two. This 
transition will be closely related to the modernization of Vietnam’s economy and further 
reductions in traditional agriculture and services. 
Second, the large discrepancies between alternative data sources confound efforts to 
evaluate Vietnam’s progress toward its avowed goal of privatization. In this respect, it is 
important for the Vietnamese government to clarify the sources of alternative measures of 
SOE or state sector production and employment. Are there important definitional issues 
involved that we have failed to understand? Or is the non-SOE state sector really as large as 
comparisons of state sector estimates from labor force surveys and national accounts and 
corresponding SOE estimates from the enterprise data imply? Perhaps more importantly, what 
is responsible for the relatively slow declines in the state sector’s share of economy-wide, 
non-household employment and GDP, compared to the rapid declines of SOE shares of 
enterprise employment and turnover? Until these questions can be answered more definitively, 
isn’t it very difficult to evaluate the degree of progress toward privatization, much less the 
economic effects of such efforts?  
We agree that further privatization is important for Vietnam and that progress has been 
relatively slow (World Bank 2011 23-50; 2014 26-27; 2015 23-24). Privatization can be 
particularly beneficial when it results from expansion of private firms in relatively 
competitive markets, because it will help improve Vietnam’s competitiveness and increase 
growth. On the other hand, several of Asia’s more efficient enterprises have been or are SOEs 
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and the state sector must play an important role regulating and/or producing in markets 
affected by externalities (e.g., markets for public goods and services). Thus, although 
privatization is usually wise, there are exceptions. In this context, the important point is that 
economists and policy makers often lack sufficient information to evaluate the extent of 
privatization and its economic effects in Vietnam (and other economies). 
Third, it is important for policy makers to recognize that the economic roles of MNEs and 
SOEs often differ greatly among economic activities. The variation in relative size of MNEs 
is particularly conspicuous. MNEs, most of which are WFs, make particularly large 
contributions to international trade, especially exporting. Relatively large investments by 
MNEs in international marketing networks which reduce transactions costs of exporting are 
particularly important. MNEs’ relatively large contribution to imports is also important 
because many of these imports are advanced capital goods and sophisticated intermediate 
inputs that facilitate increased productivity of end users.22 The large involvement of MNEs in 
Vietnam’s trade also implies that MNEs will be important agents in any attempt to liberalize 
trade, either unilaterally or as part of some free trade area agreement.  
In contrast, MNE contributions to production are more modest and MNE shares of total 
employment are small, especially if household enterprises and the self-employed are included. 
Similarly, SOEs make important contributions to production but smaller contributions to 
employment. This highlights the enclave nature of both SOEs and MNEs in modern Vietnam, 
and suggests the need to facilitate migration of household and self-employed workers to 
modern enterprises, the vast majority of which are likely to be private.  
 
  
                                                 
22 Although this paper has emphasized MNE contributions to exports, MNE import shares have also been 
large and rose rapidly from 18 percent in 1995-1996 to 31-37 percent in 2001-2009, and 53-59 percent in 




This paper has examined patterns and changes of shares of states sector, including SOEs 
and other state entities, and MNEs in Vietnam’s economy since the mid-1990s. Two major 
conclusions arise, the first being that shares of these ownership groups vary greatly among 
economic activities. Because most Vietnamese are still self-employed or household workers 
with little or no connection to the state sector or MNEs, it is important to exclude the 
household sector from these comparisons. Economy-wide estimates MNE shares of exports 
have been conspicuously large and risen quickly to over 70 percent in 2015. In contrast, MNE 
shares of non-household production (GDP) have been modest and shares of non-household 
employment much smaller. Similarly, the state sector, has accounted for larger shares of 
economy-wide non-household production than employment.  
In other words, economy-wide evidence clearly suggests that MNEs and state sector have 
had higher average labor productivity than the modern private sector, which is defined to 
exclude the household sector, and that MNEs have had higher labor productivity than the state 
sector. In addition, ratios of exports to production have been much higher in MNEs than in the 
domestic (private and state) sector. Most exports come from WFs and about one-third of WFs 
export large shares (90%+) of their sales, compared to only about one-tenth of MNE JVs and 
less than 2 percent of SOEs and private firms.  
Although the patterns described above seem clear and important, the second major 
conclusion is that careful comparisons of economy-wide estimates and estimates from 
enterprise data reveal important discrepancies that are difficult to explain. For example, SOE 
shares of firm employment and sales have decreased rapidly since 2000 and SOE export 
shares have been relatively small in recent years. On the other hand, state shares (including 
SOEs and other state entities) of non-household employment and GDP declined much more 
slowly and remained much larger than SOE shares of firm activities. Discrepancies between 
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alternative estimates of state and SOE shares have become so large they are almost certainly 
the result of large data errors in one or more sources. There are also important differences in 
alternative estimates of MNE shares, with enterprise data indicating relatively large 
employment shares but relatively small production shares. However, discrepancies are 
relatively small for MNEs.  
The most important policy issues surrounding these inconsistencies probably relate to 
extent of privatization of SOEs in Vietnam and its economic effects, about which we know far 
less than economists often assert. The large discrepancies between alternative data sources 
and the numerous problems encountered when using the enterprise data imply that results of 
rigorous studies using the firm data, including numerous studies cited in this paper, may be 
particularly sensitive to sampling and data errors, among other problems. Unfortunately, 
authors are not always forthcoming about such important shortcomings. Finally, no one 
should forget that Vietnam’s formal enterprises remain relatively small and that the majority 
of Vietnam’s workers still have very little or no relation to the activities of SOEs or MNEs. 
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 Non-Household GDP  Enterprise turnover, published  SOE JVs, unpublished
Year State MNE Pri-vate SOEs MNE WFs Private Private MNE
1995 63 10 27 - - - - - - 
1996 62 11 27 - - - - - - 
1997 62 14 25 - - - - - - 
1998 60 15 24 - - - - - - 
1999 58 18 24 - - - - - - 
2000 57 20 23 55 20 7 25 - 12
2001 56 20 23 51 20 8 29 - 11
2002 56 20 24 51 19 8 30 - 10
2003 56 21 23 46 20 9 34 - 11
2004 56 22 22 41 22 11 37 - 11
2005 55 22 22 39 22 11 39 5 10
2006 54 24 23 37 22 12 41 6 10
2007 52 25 23 32 21 12 47 6 8
2008 51 25 24 29 18 11 53 7 6
2009 51 25 24 27 18 12 54 6 5
2010 53 27 20 28 18 12 54 6 5
2011 52 28 20 26 20 14 54 6 5
2012 51 28 21 27 22 17 52 5 4
2013 50 30 20 25 25 20 50 4 2
2014 49 31 20 22 26 21 52 4 3
2015 49 31 20 - - - - - - 
Sources: General Statistics Office (2010, 2013, 2016, various years b).
Table 1: Shares of Non-Household GDP and Enterprise Turnover (percent, current 
dong)
Notes: Non-household GDP shares calculated in current prices, where 2010-2015 is 
from a 2010 base series excluding products taxes less subsidies on production, 2005-
2009 is from a 2010 base series including products taxes less subsidies, and 1995-
2004 is from a 1994 base series including products taxes less subsidies; the SOE share 
of enterprise turnover includes central government SOEs, local government SOEs and 
joint stock companies with (presumably majority) state capital; unpublished estimates 
are compiled from data on all firms with positive turnover and employment; SOE-
private joint ventures refer to private limited and joint stock companies reporting 
positive state shares of 50 percent or less; MNE-SOE JVs are explicitly identified in 
the firm-level data and presumably include all firms with positive MNE and SOE 
shares. 
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2000 - - - - - - 3,537 59 12 8 29 - 3
2001 - - - - - - 3,933 54 12 9 34 - 3
2002 - - - - - - 4,658 49 15 12 37 - 3
2003 - - - - - - 5,175 44 17 13 40 - 2
2004 - - - - - - 5,771 39 18 15 43 - 2
2005 - - - - - - 6,237 33 20 16 48 5 2
2006 - - - - - - 6,565 29 22 19 49 6 2
2007 9,058 56 55 11 17 33 7,225 24 23 20 52 7 2
2008 - - - - - - 7,949 21 23 20 56 6 2
2009 10,283 47 49 14 15 40 8,719 21 22 19 57 6 1
2010 10,645 45 48 16 16 39 9,831 17 22 19 61 5 1
2011 11,188 47 47 15 15 38 10,896 15 23 21 61 5 1
2012 11,544 46 46 15 15 39 11,085 14 25 22 61 4 1
2013 11,610 46 46 15 15 39 11,566 14 26 24 59 4 1
2014 12,311 44 44 17 17 39 12,135 13 28 26 59 3 1
2015 13,343 39 39 17 17 45 - - - - - - - 
Sources: General Statistics Office (2010, 2013, 2016, various years b; various years c).
Table 2: Total Employment and Enterprise Employment (totals in thousands, ownership shares in percent)
Notes: For non-household employment LFS series come from Labour Force Survey reports (General Statistics Office 
various years c) and also exclude self-employment while web estimates come from General Statistics Office (various 
years b); for published enterprise data, SOE enterprises include central government SOEs, local government SOEs, 
and joint stock companies with (presumably majority) state capital; unpublished estimates include all firms with 
positve turnover and employment; SOE-private joint ventures refer to private limited and joint stock companies 
reporting positive state shares of 50 percent or less; MNE-SOE JVs are explicitly identified in the firm-level data and 
presumably include all firms with positive MNE and SOE shares. . 
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2000 39 164 - 213 397 208 843 195 - 932 335
2001 41 190 - 218 362 197 843 196 - 978 230
2002 44 173 - 270 320 178 811 212 - 1,020 154
2003 49 118 - 294 335 188 920 235 - 1,232 190
2004 56 118 - 315 358 213 1,054 257 - 1,443 245
2005 69 125 - 411 384 231 1,203 286 383 1,768 280
2006 79 129 - 526 420 273 1,293 349 380 2,016 264
2007 88 135 - 649 450 304 1,386 438 458 2,227 358
2008 112 166 - 936 543 376 1,730 664 650 2,694 424
2009 125 205 - 927 575 432 1,629 660 736 2,665 542
2010 124 189 57 1,281 658 509 1,777 714 855 3,122 674
2011 154 256 74 1,682 816 663 2,149 853 1,322 4,643 784
2012 178 306 86 1,899 911 772 2,321 877 1,159 4,009 1,103
2013 195 349 94 1,867 1,018 889 2,349 918 1,125 2,656 1,851
2014 207 342 97 1,995 1,038 922 2,328 999 1,232 4,959 1,060
2015 232 344 84 - - - - - - - - 
Table 3 Non-Household GDP per Employee and Enterprise Turnover per Employee (million current dong)
Notes and Sources: See Tables 1 and 2.
Non-Household GDP 
per Worker
SOE & MNE JVs, 
unpublished
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Exports  Export/GDP ratio Exports  Non-oil exports





MNE US$bil % share US$bil % share
1995 1.473 27.03 1.127 0.205 5.508  -  -  -  - 
1996 2.155 29.70 1.182 0.223 5.294  -  -  -  - 
1997 3.213 34.98 1.319 0.245 5.393  -  -  -  - 
1998 3.215 34.35 1.178 0.251 4.692  -  -  -  - 
1999 4.682 40.57 1.333 0.272 4.893  -  -  -  - 
2000 6.810 47.02 1.646 0.284 5.799  -  -  -  - 
2001 6.798 45.23 1.512 0.292 5.178  -  -  -  - 
2002 7.872 47.12 1.632 0.292 5.587  -  -  -  - 
2003 10.161 50.43 1.776 0.295 6.015  -  -  -  - 
2004 14.488 54.70 2.107 0.311 6.772  -  -  -  - 
2005 18.554 57.18 2.123 0.284 7.473 18.517 57.45 11.130 44.80
2006 23.061 57.90 2.162 0.301 7.184 22.865 57.73 14.542 46.49
2007 27.775 57.19 2.115 0.323 6.542 27.832 57.52 19.355 48.50
2008 34.523 55.07 1.999 0.344 5.809 34.905 55.49 24.455 46.62
2009 30.372 53.19 1.655 0.305 5.427 29.854 52.76 23.644 46.94
2010 39.152 54.20 2.229 0.336 6.627 38.828 54.21 33.884 50.81
2011 55.124 56.88 2.597 0.366 7.104 55.114 56.87 47.873 53.39
2012 72.252 63.09 2.892 0.323 8.949 72.274 63.08 64.045 60.22
2013 88.150 66.76 2.965 0.310 9.559 88.190 66.74 80.913 64.80
2014 101.180 67.36 3.038 0.321 9.472 101.218 67.40 93.989 65.75
2015 114.267 70.53 3.190 0.294 10.852 114.274 70.52 110.619 69.84
Notes and sources: Annual data from General Statistics Office (various years b); cumulative 
monthly estimates from General Statistics Office (various years d); MNE shares of crude exports 
were 100 percent in 2005-2015; exchange rates from International Monetary Fund (2016).
Table 4: MNE exports, MNE shares of Vietnam's merchandise exports, and export-GDP ratios in 
MNEs and non-MNEs
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Table 5: Commodity Exports by SITC and VSIC (US$ millions)
Commodity or industry, code 2000 2010 2011 2012 2014
By SITC rev 3, total 14,483 72,237 96,906 114,529 150,217
 Manufactures, excluding food, etc., 5-8 6,193 46,666 62,664 78,978 114,057
  Textiles, 65 299 3,061 3,770 3,894 5,330
  Apparel, 84 1,821 10,390 13,149 14,443 20,174
  Leather & Footwear, 61, 85 1,481 5,489 6,987 7,793 11,093
  Wood manufactures, 63 93 247 312 390 655
  Paper manufactures, 64 59 372 418 503 546
  Plastics & Rubber, 57-58, 62 46 1,214 1,456 1,893 1,988
  Non-metallic mineral products, 66 172 936 1,247 1,816 2,869
  Metals & metal products, 67-69 120 2,738 3,854 4,202 5,634
  Electronic & electric machinery 75-77,87-88 1,064 9,309 15,857 27,795 45,101
  Non-electric machinery, 71-74 135 1,698 2,352 2,871 3,299
  Road vehicles, 78 74 721 969 1,304 1,902
  Other transportation machinery, 79 26 531 808 1,082 1,250
  Furniture, bedding, etc., 82 232 2,960 3,140 3,640 4,712
  Miscellaneous manufactures, 89 281 4,636 4,793 2,930 3,670
  Other manufactures 291 2,363 3,550 4,421 5,834
 Food, beverages, tobacco, 0-1 3,554 13,729 17,701 19,173 21,966
 Mineral fuels, 3 3,825 7,980 11,008 11,353 9,238
 Others, 2, 4, 9 912 3,862 5,533 5,024 4,956
ADDENDUM: by VSIC93 (≈ISIC rev 3), total 14,483 72,237 - - - 
 Manufactures, D 8,831 58,384 - - - 
  Food, beverages, tobacco, 15-16 2,391 10,029 - - - 
  Textiles, 17 409 5,249 - - - 
  Apparel, 18 1,696 7,941 - - - 
  Leather & footwear, 19 1,647 6,285 - - - 
  Plastics & rubber, 25 125 1,974 - - - 
  Metals & metal products, 27-28 120 2,846 - - - 
  Electronic & electric machinery, 30-33 1,101 10,014 - - - 
  Furniture, miscellaneous manufacturing, 36 400 6,452 - - - 
  Other manufacturing 943 7,594 - - - 
 Mining & quarrying, C 3,628 6,825 - - - 
Sources: General Statistics Office (various years a), United Nations COMTRADE (2016).
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Values (US$ millions) Firms (number)
Variable, industry, VSIC07 code 2011 2012 2011 2012
All industries 109,813 126,159 7,613 7,523
 -ratio to merchandise exports 1.13 1.10 - - 
Manufacturing, 10-33 83,417 107,127 6,338 6,494
 Food products, 10 8,838 9,165 859 897
 Textiles, 13 4,569 4,190 349 372
 Apparel, 14 8,626 9,411 983 1,014
 Leather & footwear, 15 5,647 8,178 341 368
 Wood products, 16 10,490 1,256 335 308
 Paper products, 17 449 2,661 178 187
 Rubber & plastics, 22 3,111 7,653 559 559
 Non-metallic mineral products, 23 983 1,285 241 257
 Basic metals, 24 997 1,991 97 115
 Metal products, 25 7,913 2,934 459 465
 Computers, electronic machinery, 26 10,279 22,185 192 212
 Electric machinery, 27 9,604 2,946 184 196
 Non-electric machinery, 28 991 974 110 118
 Motor vehicles, 29 4,163 11,612 108 125
 Other transportation machinery, 30 1,089 1,619 99 104
 Furniture, 31 2,390 11,633 562 518
 Other manufacturing, 11-12, 18-21, 32-33 3,276 7,434 682 679
Agriculture, 1-3 683 536 71 64
Mining, 5-9 2,247 8,420 65 63
Wholesale trade, 45+46 22,825 8,363 876 631
Other industries 641 1,713 263 271
Table 6: Exports and Exporting Firms with 20 or more Employees
Sources: Authors' compilation of firm-level data supplied by General Statistics Office
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WFs MNE JVs SOEs  Private
Industry; VSIC07 codes in Table 6 2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012
All industries 54.27 58.68 2.07 13.37 22.69 7.88 20.97 20.07
Manufacturing 64.72 68.41 2.65 10.54 13.78 1.74 18.85 19.31
 Food products 18.81 20.69 2.17 1.91 5.28 6.81 73.74 70.59
 Textiles 80.16 73.77 4.04 1.42 3.68 4.26 12.12 20.55
 Apparel 52.27 69.79 1.85 2.27 2.96 1.67 42.92 26.27
 Leather & footwear 76.33 69.40 3.26 2.45 1.22 0.78 19.19 27.36
 Wood products 1.30 17.64 1.47 11.82 92.24 1.58 4.99 68.95
 Paper products 76.12 75.69 2.24 0.88 1.26 0.13 20.38 23.29
 Rubber & plastics 66.33 48.22 3.69 3.20 2.96 1.23 27.02 47.35
 Non-metallic mineral products 38.97 56.63 13.63 11.68 7.16 7.68 40.24 24.01
 Basic metals 58.17 76.01 7.42 4.49 0.67 0.38 33.74 19.12
 Metal products 94.84 79.11 0.28 4.93 0.42 1.50 4.46 14.46
 Computers, electronic machinery 99.40 98.75 0.28 1.08 0.12 0.06 0.20 0.10
 Electric machinery 96.62 90.71 2.41 6.26 0.26 0.87 0.71 2.16
 Non-electric machinery 90.32 91.71 2.55 0.75 1.33 1.45 5.80 6.08
 Motor vehicles 96.96 25.96 2.44 73.74 0.04 0.02 0.56 0.28
 Other transportation machinery 38.35 54.34 39.10 38.32 22.36 7.06 0.19 0.27
 Furniture 64.17 92.22 2.97 0.79 0.58 0.18 32.28 6.81
 Other manufacturing 74.82 73.65 2.98 1.85 10.45 5.05 11.75 19.44
Agriculture 5.70 8.83 0.58 0.77 91.84 88.13 1.88 2.27
Mining 3.78 0.88 1.88 65.98 90.62 31.99 3.72 1.15
Wholesale trade 23.77 5.89 0.02 0.03 45.63 43.02 30.58 51.07
Other industries 9.30 7.08 2.43 0.56 53.12 77.23 35.15 15.14
Table 7: Distributions of Exports by Firms with 20 or more Employees among Ownership Groups 
(% of exports by industry)
Sources: Authors' compilation of firm-level data supplied by General Statistics Office; exchange rates 
for converting turnover from International Monetary Fund (2016)
33
WFs MNE JVs SOEs   Private
Industry; VSIC07 codes in Table 6 2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012
All industries 32.98 32.49 9.44 11.69 1.36 1.24 1.78 1.69
Manufacturing 39.89 39.40 19.54 23.08 4.68 3.93 5.52 5.47
 Food products 25.76 30.58 12.73 23.64 10.67 7.14 8.68 8.35
 Textiles 25.47 29.30 12.50 11.76 0.00 10.71 3.24 4.91
 Apparel 55.73 57.44 55.88 55.56 37.93 28.57 14.78 13.73
 Leather & footwear 62.45 58.98 77.78 70.00 27.27 28.57 14.48 13.85
 Wood products 38.16 37.35 52.63 52.94 5.26 5.88 7.94 7.34
 Paper products 24.79 24.58 25.00 50.00 0.00 0.00 1.43 1.93
 Rubber & plastics 39.85 34.32 23.08 26.09 4.55 4.55 2.53 2.79
 Non-metallic mineral products 26.83 26.80 3.13 12.50 0.00 0.00 1.56 1.68
 Basic metals 24.14 27.14 16.67 5.00 0.00 0.00 0.72 1.92
 Metal products 31.03 32.17 7.69 20.51 0.00 0.00 1.27 0.57
 Computers, electronic machinery 51.66 49.79 0.00 18.18 12.50 20.00 3.09 2.73
 Electric machinery 36.88 37.72 0.00 8.33 0.00 0.00 1.01 0.66
 Non-electric machinery 40.96 33.00 16.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.93 0.98
 Motor vehicles 32.06 29.63 6.67 10.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
 Other transportation machinery 14.89 15.46 0.00 7.14 9.38 5.41 0.00 0.00
 Furniture 58.74 55.25 60.00 69.23 0.00 0.00 11.83 10.96
 Other manufacturing 34.95 34.09 9.84 5.97 0.00 0.00 1.42 2.21
Agriculture 19.23 13.21 12.50 14.29 0.27 0.00 0.05 0.00
Mining 37.50 37.50 6.67 30.77 4.05 5.06 1.26 1.38
Wholesale trade 6.47 4.91 0.00 0.00 1.58 1.53 1.21 0.77
Other industries 2.85 3.97 0.71 1.41 0.07 0.14 0.05 0.06
Table 8: Shares of Firms with 20 or more Employees Exporting 90%+ of Turnover 
(% of all firms in each ownerhip-industry group) 
Sources: Authors' compilation of firm-level data supplied by General Statistics Office; exchange rates 
for converting turnover from International Monetary Fund (2016)
34
